

# **Jamaica, Haiti, Diasporas and Peace Building**

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**Andrew Harrington**

**Stewart Prest**

**Per Unheim**

**David Carment**

**CIFP, Carleton University, Ottawa**

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## *Executive Summary*

Jamaica and Haiti at first may appear to be odd choices for a study of the potential role of the diaspora to promote peace building and conflict resolution. Neither country appears to suffer from the type of overt conflicts characterized by insurgents, guerrillas and foreign intervention that have plagued other countries in the region. The composition and characteristics of the diaspora populations of the two countries as well as the impetus for migration in each case are markedly different, as are the socio-economic conditions in each country. Yet, beyond these dissimilarities, Jamaica and Haiti are joined by the difficulty in how, or where, to place the civil and socio-economic antagonisms, clashes and competition within the broader framework of conflict studies.

Both countries manifest many indicators of fragility and open conflict: high morbidity and mortality rates from violence in Jamaica; the series of foreign interventions in Haiti; large, well-armed extra-judicial groups operating with a large degree of impunity in both countries. Moreover, both are relatively small societies with the inherent dangers of the personalization, as opposed to the politicization, of grievance and hostility. As Small Island Developing States (SIDS), Jamaica and Haiti face specific challenges that differ from those encountered in large, more diverse states.<sup>1</sup>

But the question remains, do such findings constitute evidence of conflict? This paper argues that Jamaica's domestic problems have not resulted in the wholesale outbreak of violence/conflict, but rather persistent low-level civil violence and an exceptionally high crime rate, related primarily to inter and intra gang violence.<sup>2</sup> In contrast, Haiti has experienced full collapse, triggering numerous foreign interventions in response. Yet, in both cases, the term 'conflict' does not seem entirely appropriate. Haiti and Jamaica may be part of a trend or at least representative of an important sub-set of nations within the area of study of conflict and fragile states. While reflections about intervention in failed and fragile states most often concern open conflict, increasing attention is turning to interventions – defined broadly and encompassing the full range of development, political and social activities undertaken by multilateral and bilateral

development agencies – geared toward strengthening fragile states and preventing state failure. In this regard, the roles of Jamaican and Haitian diaspora communities offer instructive insights as case studies.

This paper has two aims. First, it blends, and to a certain extent juxtaposes, two viewpoints on the nature of ‘conflict’ within these countries. It also presents preliminary thoughts about the potential role the two diasporas can play in lessening conflict and strengthening the two societies. One viewpoint is that of traditional conflict studies, while the other is that of traditional diaspora studies. The paper begins with definitions and discussions of the two diasporas followed by an analysis of the nature of ‘conflict’ in the two countries from the views of both conflict and diaspora studies. It concludes with thoughts regarding the role the two nations’ diasporas can play in strengthening their home societies.

## *The Jamaican and Haitian Diasporas*

Defining Diaspora:

The term “diaspora” has come to be widely used in the past few years beyond its original narrow association with Greek, Jewish and Armenian communities. Today it refers to the totality of individuals identifying themselves by and acting upon their origin in and/or ties to a territory other than the one in which they reside.<sup>3</sup> Members of a diaspora may include migrants, 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> or even 3<sup>rd</sup> generation immigrants as well as expatriates, students, guest workers and refugees. The term reflects the rise of truly transnational populations, people who can be thought of as almost literally living in two places, playing an active role in two communities simultaneously.

The connections that today’s diasporas retain with their communities of origin differ markedly and substantially from those held by previous generations of migrants. Technological advances in the late 20th century – the rise of cheap and ubiquitous telecommunications and travel coupled with financial liberalization – have created a new type of “hyper-connectivity” between diasporas and their home communities. Diasporas today are connected instantaneously, continuously, and intimately to their communities of origin in ways that were unimaginable to earlier generations. Cell phones, calling cards, discount air travel, the Internet, and open financial systems have replaced letters, steamships and weeks-old newspapers. The technologies of globalization have created new realities and new possibilities for immigrants, resulting in a profound and decisive rupture with experiences of the past, insofar as immigrants no longer must endure a decisive rupture with their homeland. For example, during the great exodus from Ireland, families would hold wakes for those immigrating to the New World, based on the assumption that family members would not be returning to Ireland. Today, most people migrate with the knowledge that return will always be physically and financially possible, even if not politically feasible.

This concept of an almost assured ability to return and the heightened connections it engenders is a distinct marker for modern migration. One of the first instances of this new reality was in post-WWII


migration from the Caribbean to the United States and particularly the second great wave of migration from Puerto Rico to New York in the 1950s and 60s. This was one of the first modern waves of migration to occur primarily by air travel. With a travel time of less than 4 hours between San Juan and New York, migrants from the island literally could have breakfast in San Juan and lunch in Manhattan. Even in an era of air travel and telecommunications, however, distance still matters. In the case of migration to the US and Canada from the Caribbean, the short distance in time and space that migrants travel, and concomitant cheaper cost of making such journeys, leads in some ways to more robust connections with their home communities. These trends will become apparent throughout the following two case studies, beginning with Jamaica.

### ***Jamaica***


The population living in Jamaica now stands at 2.7 million with about another 50 percent of that number residing off-island. Historically, Jamaican emigration rates have been relatively high, with three main destinations: the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States.

Migration to Britain intensified after the Second World War, peaking in the 1960s. Between 1955 and 1959, 20,000 to 33,000 people per year moved to the

United Kingdom from the West Indies and 168,000 entered between 1960 and 1962. Immigration from the Caribbean was then curtailed under the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which limited the rights of citizens of Commonwealth of Nations countries (including Jamaica) to migrate to the UK. Today Jamaicans living in the UK are concentrated in Brixton and Tottenham.




Immigration to Canada followed a reverse trend to the United Kingdom as black migration to Canada was essentially outlawed from 1818 until 1962. Even during the period when black migration from the West Indies was discouraged however, Canadian immigration policy allowed exceptions for applicants with “exceptional qualifications,” such as registered nurses, stenographers and other professional occupations. According to the 2001 Canadian Census, there are



approximately 122,000 Jamaican-born immigrants in Canada, the vast majority of which live in the city of Toronto, where 3.5 percent of the population is Jamaican-born. The size of the Jamaican diaspora in Canada, including second-generation children, is estimated at over 200,000.

The last US census accounts for over 736,000 persons of Jamaican ancestry living in the United States. According to the 1990 Census, about 56 percent of the West Indian diaspora in the United States resides in the New York City area, with significant populations living in nearby suburbs located in Connecticut and New Jersey. After the greater New York City region, the second largest concentration is in Florida; the population there is almost as large as the entire West Indian population in



Canada. Sizeable Jamaican populations are also found in Boston and the Washington D.C.-Maryland area.

## *Haiti*

Migration from Haiti has been influenced by economic as well as political factors. In the 1930s large numbers of Haitians left the country for sugar plantations in Cuba. The largest wave of migration occurred between 1982 and the present however, with more than 1 million people leaving Haiti primarily for the Dominican Republic, Canada and the United States. In addition, a significant number of Haitians migrated throughout the Caribbean and especially to the Bahamas. In 1980, the Bahamian government recorded 11,000 Haitians; by 2000 this number had risen to 21,000, or seven percent of the total population. Current unofficial estimates used by newspapers and Bahamian Foreign Service officials put the total number of illegal Haitians at over 75,000, or 25 percent of the Bahamian population. Given the distance and expense, Haitian emigration to France is less significant. Official government figures put the Haitian born population in France at 28,000; if one were to count children born in France and undocumented residents, the figure might be as high as 50,000.

According to a 2004 study commissioned by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Haitian diaspora in Canada is estimated at close to 80,000 individuals, approximately 54,000 of whom were born in Haiti. Estimates by the Haitian consulate and several of the major Haitian organizations in Montreal, however, put the total size of the diaspora closer to 120,000. Haitians in Canada are overwhelmingly concentrated in Montreal, which is officially estimated to have close to 70,000 residents of Haitian origin. The next largest concentration is in the national capital region of Ottawa-Gatineau, home to over 5,000 residents of Haitian origin.

According to the 2000 US Census there are just over 550,000 persons of Haitian descent residing in the United States. Current estimates of the size of the Haitian population in the United States vary widely however, due to the large numbers of Haitians entering the country illegally. For example, between 1972 and 1981, the US Immigration and Naturalization Service reported that while it registered 55,000 Haitians arriving in Florida by boat, an estimated additional 50,000 likely landed and escaped detection. Today official US census figures list roughly 550,000 people of Haitian origin in the US, but

# HAITIAN-AMERICANS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (HAFED)

## ESTIMATE OF HAITIANS AND AMERICANS OF HAITIAN ORIGINE IN THE UNITED STATES

NUMBER	STATE	U.S. BORN	NATIONALIZED	NON-U.S. CITIZEN	TOTAL	CLASS
01	ALABAMA	97	4	83	184	36th
02	ALASKA	81	7	22	110	42nd
03	ARIZONA	247	117	177	541	27th
04	ARKANSAS	48	8	21	77	44th
05	CALIFORNIA	4098	2249	1857	8204	9th
06	COLORADO	57	26	32	115	41st
07	CONNECTICUT	5958	1784	4175	11917	8th
08	DELAWARE	215	60	155	430	28th
09	FLORIDA	260505	38062	86835	385402	2nd
10	GEORGIA	2115	765	1350	4230	11th
11	HAWAII	126	18	73	217	34th
12	IDAHO	21	8	16	45	48th
13	ILLINOIS	9655	2845	3863	16363	5th
14	INDIANA	335	86	128	549	25th
15	IOWA	83	47	37	167	37th
16	KANSAS	264	29	88	381	29th
17	KENTUCKY	351	91	117	559	24th
18	LOUISIANA	894	125	298	1317	16th
19	MAINE	183	12	61	256	32nd
20	MARYLAND	8562	671	2854	12087	7th
21	MASSACHUSETTS	39760	3960	19680	63600	4th
22	MICHIGAN	238	16	52	306	30th
23	MINNESOTA	501	82	167	750	22nd
24	MISSISSIPPI	435	59	145	639	23rd
25	MISSOURI	867	136	289	1292	17th
26	MONTANA	33	17	11	61	47th
27	NEBRASKA	30	3	10	43	49th
28	NEVADA	168	11	56	235	33rd
29	NEW-HAMPSHIRE	534	77	178	789	20th
30	NEW JERSEY	48273	4748	16091	69112	3rd
31	NEW MEXICO	54	15	18	87	43rd
32	NEW YORK	326211	78681	108737	513629	1st
33	NORTH CAROLINA	789	124	263	1176	18th
34	NORTH DAKOTA	48	7	16	71	45th
35	OHIO	741	58	247	1046	19th
36	OKLAHOMA	207	11	69	287	31st
37	OREGON	99	29	33	161	38th
38	PENNSYLVANIA	5331	793	1777	7901	10th
39	RHODE ISLAND	2094	148	698	2940	12th
40	SOUTH CAROLINA	483	116	161	760	21st
41	SOUTH DAKOTA	6	3	2	11	50th
42	TENNESSEE	882	278	294	1454	15th
43	TEXAS	6316	2055	2772	13143	6th
44	UTAH	87	27	29	143	39th
45	VERMONT	93	17	31	141	40th
46	VIRGINIA	1968	295	656	2919	13th
47	WASHINGTON	348	78	116	542	26th
48	WEST VIRGINIA	45	5	15	65	46th
49	WISCONSIN	141	14	47	202	35th
50	WYOMING	6	3	2	11	50th
	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	1011	362	758	2131	14th
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>733694</b>	<b>139242</b>	<b>255862</b>	<b>1128798</b>	

SOURCE : 1) Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce  
2) Haitian Embassy and Consulates in the U.S.  
3) Haitian Community Organizations in the U.S.

consular officials and community leaders put the true figure at well over 1 million. As with Jamaicans, the largest concentration of Haitians in the US is in the greater New York City area, followed by Florida and Massachusetts.

Figures for the size of the Haitian diaspora in the Dominican Republic are more difficult to obtain due to the fluidity of movement of people across the border, political tensions over migration in the Dominican Republic, and the lack of documentation among migrants. A 1983 survey by the International Labour Office (ILO) estimated that between 200,000 and 500,000 Haitians lived in the Dominican Republic.

### *Overview*

As discussed previously, Haiti and Jamaica have large diaspora communities that offer opportunities for political and economic entrepreneurs. These linkages also serve as vehicles for positive change and transformation at local, national and regional levels. Both Jamaica and Haiti are Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and therefore face specific vulnerabilities that on one hand immunize them somewhat from conventional effects of large-scale conflict and horizontal diffusion, but on the other create opportunities for grinding low-intensity organized violence that can be protracted and highly disruptive. A key question remains why such violence has had such catastrophic repercussions Haiti, but not in Jamaica. Does the answer lie in part in the distinct role the diaspora have played in Jamaica?

In answering this question we begin by noting that that the linkages between diaspora groups and the home countries can be ambiguous in their effects, with both positive and negative consequences for the stability of the home country. In order to fully appreciate and understand the full impact of these complex relationships, the full range of diaspora activities and effects must be properly documented, weighed, and evaluated. To cite just one example, while Jamaica and Haiti may be unlikely to engage in direct confrontation with neighbouring states, they have in the past engaged in "safety valve" behaviours whereby internal conflict is allowed to build to a certain level and is then externalized. In the case of

Haiti, the capacity to manage this kind of dangerous process has been compromised and subsequently contained by international actors, while in Jamaica the effects continue to be manifest in low-intensity violence in Jamaica that at times spills over into the diaspora community. In examining the security dimension, a related question revolves around the role that the diasporas of Haiti and Jamaica play in protest, rebellion and other forms of mobilization. Is the criminalization of conflict more likely than, for example, political mobilization? Put differently, are we looking at the diffusion of conflict driven by greed rather than grievance?

In an attempt to answer such questions, we first identify the background conditions as well as proximate causes that generate insecurity in Jamaica and Haiti. Treating each country as a separate case study allows us to tease out distinct patterns of conflict, criminality and cooperation and then draw conclusions based on a comparison of these patterns. We then examine the ties and potential roles of each country's diaspora communities as positive forces for change in both countries.

## ***Background***

### ***Case Study: Jamaica***

Jamaica, like many other SIDS, faces specific challenges unlike those encountered in larger, more diverse states. As suggested in a recent publication on assessing state fragility in SIDS, to the extent that conflict-related activities are present they are manifest in problems and vulnerabilities that are not necessarily associated with conventional civil conflict. Consequently, such phenomena tend to be overlooked in studies that employ standard measures of conflict such as the number of battle-related deaths.<sup>4</sup>

Key challenges for Jamaica arise from the country's political environment, its socio-economic situation, and the subsequent violence and criminality that these problems generate. Jamaica's domestic problems have not resulted in a wholesale outbreak of open conflict, but rather persistent low-level civil violence and a high crime rate, primarily related to gang activities.<sup>5</sup> It should be noted that while these problems exist across the island, the focal point is the capital city of Kingston. Further urbanization may

lead to an expansion of this instability; however the proportion of Jamaicans living in urban areas is expected to increase by only two percent between 2003 and 2015, to 54.2 percent of Jamaica's total population.<sup>6</sup>

### ***Proximate Causes of Conflict and Crime***

#### ***Political Factors***

Jamaica, an independent member of the Commonwealth since 1962, may be characterized paradoxically as a stable two-party parliamentary democracy – in which representatives are elected from the island's 14 parishes for a maximum of five years in office – and as a state marked by a tendency for violent unrest to erupt in the lead-up to the quadrennial general elections.<sup>7</sup>

The accession of Portia-Simpson Miller, former Minister of Local Government, Community Development and Sport and party veteran, to the leadership of the People's National Party (PNP) signals a likely fifth successive term in power for her party.<sup>8</sup> The centre-left PNP has governed Jamaica since 1989, when it ousted its long-standing opponent, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP).<sup>9</sup> Having taken over from former Prime Minister Percival James (P.J.) Patterson in March 2006 after an internal vote, Miller became *de facto* Prime Minister of a government haunted by a reputation for corruption,<sup>10</sup> inefficiency and “political tribalism.”<sup>11</sup> In the words of a recent Transparency International report: “Petty corruption, political corruption and narcotics-related corruption in Jamaica are prevalent, undermine the quality of the country's long established democracy, and retard its prospects for economic development.”<sup>12</sup> Moreover, according to the same organization's *Corruption Perceptions Index 2005*, Jamaica ranked 64<sup>th</sup> out of 175 countries in 2005, a slight improvement over the previous year, in which it placed 74<sup>th</sup> out of 145.<sup>13</sup>

Perhaps partially as a response to such criticism, the government has recently taken steps to crack down on corruption and promote good governance. New measures require Members of Parliament and civil servants to declare their assets upon assuming office or taking up their position; the government has

also introduced access to information legislation and enacted the *Corruption Prevention Act*.<sup>14</sup> Unfortunately, controls for party financing are notably absent from the *Act*.

### ***Socio-economic Factors***

As is typical for many SIDS, Jamaica's economy depends significantly upon primary commodity exports – namely sugar, bauxite and aluminium – as well as tourism and remittances sent home from islanders working abroad. The country is also highly vulnerable to the economic shocks that frequently accompany natural disasters such as Hurricanes Ivan, Emily and Dennis in 2004 and 2005 and to volatile commodity prices on international markets.<sup>15</sup> The latter is exemplified by the European Union's recent decision to cut the price paid for Jamaican sugar by 36 percent over the next four years, a policy shift likely to hurt exporters not only in Jamaica but throughout the Caribbean.<sup>16</sup> The agriculture and manufacturing sectors remain Jamaica's two largest employers, though the distributive trade sector – wholesale and retail trades – has been the largest contributor to Jamaica's GDP for over a decade.<sup>17</sup>

In addition to the vulnerabilities noted above, Jamaica's national debt to GDP ratio is extreme, currently standing at 136.5 percent, up from 80.6 percent in 1997.<sup>18</sup> If interest rates were to escalate rapidly in the near future, this would clearly have a large and unsavoury impact on the economy.<sup>19</sup> High debt payments combined with the concomitant need to generate surpluses have severely limited government spending, including on social welfare programs. A persistent increase in domestic price levels has also been a concern for Jamaican consumers over the last five years, with inflation reaching 15.3 percent annually in 2005 after several years of relatively low rates in the late 1990s.

Though these statistics are not encouraging, other trends appear more positive. Unemployment dropped nearly 3.5 percentage points to 10.9 percent between 2002 and October 2005,<sup>20</sup> while the opening of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy on 1 January 2006, is hoped to encourage employment, trade and travel opportunities between member countries throughout the region.<sup>21</sup> Further, the implementation of the PetroCaribe agreement, through which Jamaica and thirteen other Caribbean nations will import oil from Venezuela at discounted prices, should reduce the country's vulnerability to

volatile petroleum prices.<sup>22</sup> In addition to these developments, the Jamaican government now seems to understand the importance of reducing its national debt to sustainable levels through fiscal austerity measures and investment promotion.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, though a five-year commitment to achieve this goal was outlined in 1998, the country's national debt to GDP ratio continued to climb until 2004, when it saw its first reduction since the 1996-97 fiscal year.<sup>24</sup>

### *Criminality and Persistent Low Intensity Violence*

Likely many SIDS, Jamaica has suffered neither international conflict nor open civil war in 40 years of independence; instead, various political and economic problems have manifest themselves in persistent low-intensity internal violence and civil unrest.<sup>25</sup> Arguably, the key factor driving such activity is gang-related violence. Some Jamaican gangs have political dimensions, having served – **and in some cases been created to serve** – as enforcement wings for the country's dominant political parties, the PNP and JLP. The gangs were used in the past by both parties to incubate urban 'garrison communities,' in which coercion and threat of violence were used to mobilize voters and bring preferred candidates to power.<sup>26</sup> The victor would channel government funds into 'affiliate' neighbourhoods, while losing garrisons were ignored. By the 1980's, clashes between the militant wings of the two parties resulted in many fatalities.<sup>27</sup> Sporadic riots, intimidation, and police crackdowns on opposition parties continue to characterize general election periods.<sup>28</sup> Previous electoral campaigns have also featured allegations that security forces had been "hand-picked" to "target and intimidate" opposition groups.<sup>29</sup> While such allegations have subsequently been dismissed, they nonetheless provide a strong indication of the politicization of violence on the island.

While originally dependent on political payouts, some gangs turned to the drug trade to supplement their income while retaining strong political links to the PNP and JLP.<sup>30</sup> A number of other local and international gangs have emerged to capitalize on the lucrative illicit drug racket and now control various neighbourhoods. Grinding 'tit for tat' gang-related violence led the way to a record 1700 homicides and a high overall crime rate in 2005.<sup>31</sup> Despite a positive trend in Jamaica's unemployment

rate and a ‘youth bulge’ – the proportion of the population under 15 years of age – that has declined over the past 15 years, 30 percent of Jamaica’s population is under 15 and school enrolment beyond the primary level is decreasing.<sup>32</sup> Increased gang participation among disenfranchised youth therefore seems probable in light of the paucity of available opportunities.<sup>33</sup>

Gang activity in foreign cities with large Jamaican diaspora communities is often connected with gang activity in Jamaica, and vice versa. Jamaicans deported from the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada often re-assimilate into gangs in Jamaica; soon after arrival, some criminal deportees reconstitute their former gangs, or join new ones, and can easily recruit from a large supply of unemployed local teenagers eager to learn from their ‘cultured’ cousins.<sup>34</sup> That said, despite 2,161 alleged criminals being deported to Jamaica in 2005, concrete evidence regarding the extent to which they contribute to criminality in Jamaica remains elusive.<sup>35</sup> What is certain, however, is that convicted criminals – as opposed to those deported for minor infractions or visa violations – once deported, often leave with valuable knowledge regarding the sophisticated crimes and crime prevention systems in their host country. Further, they may retain connections abroad through which they can receive illegal weapons and ammunition in exchange for Jamaican-grown and trafficked narcotics.<sup>36</sup> In addition, many deportees with no connections to criminal activity may nonetheless still present a burden to social service institutions in Jamaica and can be a source of tension within communities and families.

Major riots are frequent in Jamaica. The “Gas Riots” of 1999 were related to the government’s decision to raise fuel prices 30 percent, an act that proved too much for a population fed up with poor political and economic conditions.<sup>37</sup> Riots again broke out in 2001 when surprise police raids against former Prime Minister and JLP leader Edward Seaga’s ‘garrison community’ of Tivoli Gardens caused simmering gang hostilities to erupt into wholesale violence both against security forces and among rival gangs. The resulting chaos required the deployment of the Jamaican Defence Force (JDF) onto the streets of Kingston to restore order.<sup>38</sup>

In response to persistent problems with drugs and gang-related violence, the JDF has combined forces with the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) and law enforcement agencies from the United States and England for ‘Operation Kingfish,’ which aims to destroy organized drug syndicates in Jamaica. Opinions on its effectiveness vary.<sup>39</sup> In addition, as a result of a perceived lack of faith in Jamaican security apparatus’ and the perceived inadequacy of the justice system, vigilantism and spontaneous mob killings in response to crime are a continuing problem.<sup>40</sup>

### **Case Study: Haiti**

#### ***Background***

Haiti is a troubled country, beset by a range of economic and social problems and plagued by recurrent political and social clashes. Unlike the more specific problems faced by Jamaica and most other SIDS, Haiti’s problems span the full spectrum of public life, thereby undermining state functions.<sup>41</sup> Governmental authority and capacity eroded during the latter years of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s second term and throughout the tenure of the subsequent interim government, such that entire regions of the country fell under local gang and militia domination. Many such territories remain outside central government authority today.

Encouragingly, the country has been enjoying a period of relative peace in the wake of the 2006 presidential and legislative elections, which were widely viewed as successful. The effects of the election should not be overstated, however. While they represent a significant window of opportunity for the government and international community to initiate a renewed and reinvigorated program of political and economic reform, Haiti’s position remains precarious. Core government institutions lack sufficient resources and are tainted by corruption, while armed groups remain active throughout the country. Improvement in the short to medium term will require a degree of mutual tolerance among Haiti’s fractious political factions, as well as significant, prolonged, and closely coordinated international engagement in the country.

Apart from its turbulent political circumstances, Haiti features a wide range of other potentially destabilizing factors. Chief among these is its moribund economy. Prolonged civil unrest has combined with significant environmental degradation and hurricane damage to leave vast portions of the population without even minimal economic support. The World Bank estimates remittances now account for 24.8 percent of the country's GDP in 2004, exceeding the country's total merchandise exports for the year.<sup>42</sup> While providing a vital pillar of support to the economy – particularly in the wake of adverse economic shocks – such dependence on remittances underscore the country's underlying economic weakness. The little wealth existing in the country is highly unequally distributed, with the top 1 percent of the population reportedly controlling roughly 50 percent of Haiti's total wealth.<sup>43</sup>

### ***Proximate Causes of Conflict and Crime***

#### ***Political Factors:***

The recent transition from the interim government headed by President Boniface Alexandre and Prime Minister Gérard Latortue to the newly elected government of President René Préval took place in a relatively peaceful manner. Despite a degree of controversy surrounding voting and ballot counting during the presidential election, most observers consider the election to have been free and fair.<sup>44</sup> More importantly, for the time being major factions within Haiti also appear to have accepted the result. Taken together, the successful electoral exercises present the country with an extremely valuable window of opportunity, providing the country's government with a level of political legitimacy not seen since Préval's first electoral victory in 1996.

In addition, and against the expectations of many, the country is currently experiencing a period of relative peace. Levels of violence have declined steadily over the last six months.<sup>45</sup> The relative calm appears to be the result of a tacit truce between major armed groups in the wake of the presidential and legislative elections.<sup>46</sup> One must be careful therefore not to overstate impact of Préval's election on overall stability in the country. Those who supported Préval during the election now expect him to govern

in a way that is favourable to their interests. At the moment, most factions appear to have adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach to how the government performs. Given Préval’s decision to include several former opposition members in his cabinet, it seems he intends to reach out to opposing groups and govern beyond traditional party lines.<sup>47</sup>

Such openness is likely at least partly in response to the results of the recent legislative election. Though Préval’s L’Espwa (Hope) party finished well, they do not control a majority in either the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies. Early indications suggest that L’Espwa will work closely with the Fanmi Lavalas, the party of former President Aristide, a fact that may complicate Préval’s efforts to bring hardened Aristide opponents onside.<sup>48</sup> However, even when acting together, the two parties do not control a majority in either house of Haiti’s National Assembly, forcing Préval and his newly appointed Prime Minister, Jacques Edouard Alexis, to search for non-traditional sources of support when submitting significant pieces of legislation to the National Assembly.

Collectively, such developments provide some grounds for hope that Haiti will be able to achieve some level of stable government over the short to medium term. Given that no group can control the National Assembly outright, various parties must work with one another or face the prospect of legislative deadlock. However, peace – both in the National Assembly and in the broader society – remains fragile. Should armed groups, such as the gangs in control of Cité Soleil still loyal to Aristide, or various groups of neo-Duvalierist military officers, conclude that Préval’s regime is working against their interests, they may abandon their truce with both the government and one another. Similarly, should opposition political parties find themselves under undue pressure to conform with an agenda set by the L’Espwa and Lavalas parties, they may resort to obstructionist tactics in the legislature and stymie efforts to introduce legislation essential for government and civil service reform in Haiti.

Haiti’s civil service is a serious area of concern for the country. The Haitian National Police (PNH), Haiti’s only formal law enforcement body, has not achieved satisfactory levels of professionalism, effectiveness, and impartiality.<sup>49</sup> Despite substantial initial investment in the force following Aristide’s

reinstatement in 1994, the PNH has been undermined by numerous factors, including a lack of sufficient and sustained international funding; minimal support from the relatively poorly trained judicial branch and correctional services; increasing dependence on, and subservience to, the country's executive; and the growth of a pervasive culture of corruption engendered by the illicit drug industry. Reports also indicate that assistance provided by the international community has created further problems. For example, during the re-installation of President Aristide, the US government decided to use offers of employment as police officers to entice Haitians who had been intercepted fleeing the country and interred at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to return to Haiti.<sup>50</sup> Large numbers were hastily trained and sent back to the country, undermining attempts to build a cohesive and highly qualified force. Initially numbering some 5,000 officers, the force had shrunk to around 2000 by the summer of 2004.<sup>51</sup> Estimates suggest the number is similar today.<sup>52</sup> Given the 7.6 million people currently living in Haiti, it is unlikely such a small force would be able to effectively provide for peace and security throughout the country, even were it at its original strength.

The Haitian judiciary presents another potentially destabilizing institution. Unlike the PNH, Haiti's judiciary did not receive thorough training from multinational forces following Aristide's 1994 reinstatement. As a result, its work has long been considered suspect by many international observers, with a culture of legal impunity extending back to the Duvalier era. The recent release of several key members of Aristide's cabinet, many of whom had been incarcerated without trial since early 2004, suggests that Préval and his cabinet are actively working both to separate themselves from this legacy of judicial impunity and fulfill the expectations of their supporters in the Fanmi Lavalas.<sup>53</sup> While important, such symbolic gestures must be followed by deep reform of the judiciary, initiated by the government and supported by the international community.<sup>54</sup>

More generally, corruption continues to be a destabilizing force in both the public and private arena. Transparency International ranked the country 155 out of 159 in the *2005 Corruption Perceptions Index*.<sup>55</sup> Clearly, most Haitians feel it is a serious problem. The results of a survey performed by *La*

*Fondation Heritage Haitian* (LFHH) at the end of 2003 indicate the perceived causes of this corruption are numerous and varied, with the most commonly cited being the toxic combination of economic pressure, flawed institutions, the lure of “easy money,” and a lack of political will to address the problem.<sup>56</sup>

***Socio-economic Factors:***

According to the World Bank, Haiti’s per capita GDP shrank by an annual average of more than 5 percent over the period 1985-1995.<sup>57</sup> The country achieved limited gains in GDP from 1995-1999, only to see them erased in the turbulence following Aristide’s 2000 re-election. By 2003, the most recent year on record, Haiti’s per capita income was just USD\$441 (in constant 2000 USD\$), more than 1/3 less than it had been in 1990.<sup>58</sup> This decline clearly has had a devastating effect on the population, with 55 percent of Haitians now surviving on less than USD\$1 per day, and 76 percent of the population living on less than USD\$2.<sup>59</sup> According to UNDP standards, 50 percent of Haitians are considered undernourished; in addition, life expectancy has fallen steadily throughout the previous two decades, to 51.8 years in 2002.<sup>60</sup> In addition to Haiti’s many poverty-driven problems, there are also issues related to the extreme inequality that exists in the country. Haiti has a small upper class that controls most of the country’s resources, with the top one percent of the population reportedly controlling roughly 50 percent of Haiti’s total wealth.<sup>61</sup>

In addition to such issues of income and distribution of wealth, Haiti also suffers from a range of macroeconomic problems, including an extreme and chronic lack of liquidity. The levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign aid increased somewhat in the latter half of the 1990’s, but collapsed again in the wake of Aristide’s 2000 re-election and the resulting American decision to suspend direct bilateral aid. At the same time, net foreign direct investment fell to almost nothing. The cumulative result has been a critical lack of capital for new economic investment.<sup>62</sup>

Haiti’s industry has gradually decayed since the early 1990’s. The modest light-manufacturing sector, once a reliable source of employment, has almost completely collapsed.<sup>63</sup> Haiti’s other traditional

exports are largely agricultural, including cash crops like sugarcane, coffee, and mangoes.<sup>64</sup> Exports of these goods continue to languish due to protectionist agriculture tariffs, as well as increased competition from new market players such as Vietnam.<sup>65</sup> There are few other sources of economic growth within the country; as a result, Haitians must increasingly turn to other sources of income, including international remittances and, in more extreme cases, illicit activities such as corruption, kidnapping, and drug trafficking.

Other factors underlying Haiti's current instability stem from the country's underlying demographic structure. For instance, as of 2001, Haiti's population density stood at 295 people/km<sup>2</sup>, compared to an already high 176 people/km<sup>2</sup> in the Dominican Republic and 239 people/km<sup>2</sup> in Jamaica.<sup>66</sup> Haiti's youth bulge is also a cause for concern, as 39.4 percent of the Haitian population fell into this category in 2002.<sup>67</sup> Such large groups of unskilled workers are difficult to integrate even into functional economies, and Haiti's unemployment rate is already around 50 percent. As in Jamaica, such imbalances do not bode well for stability in Haiti, as young, unemployed or underemployed males are by far the demographic most likely to engage in criminal activity, terrorism, and insurgency activities.<sup>68</sup>

Much of the extreme environmental degradation in Haiti, particularly the widespread deforestation, is a function of the above demographic factors; it is also the result of the high level of poverty in the country. For decades, rural Haitians have turned to local forests as a source for cooking fuel in the absence of reliable and affordable alternatives. In 2000, 880km<sup>2</sup> of forest remained, covering just 3.2 percent of the total land area. The remaining forest was disappearing at a rate of over 5 percent per year. Without significant tree cover, the land cannot absorb even moderate levels of rainfall.<sup>69</sup> Thus, the effects of any given tropical storm are magnified in Haiti when compared with other countries in the region. During intense phenomena such as tropical storm Jeanne, Haiti's limited infrastructure breaks down quickly in affected areas, producing tragic results. Populations are largely left to fend for themselves; the only support available is that provided by the international community.<sup>70</sup>

### *Crime and Conflict in Haiti*

There have been 35 changes of government since Haiti won independence from France in 1804; most of these changes have been violent.<sup>71</sup> The most recent cycle of violence began in 2000, following controversial elections that returned Jean-Bertrand Aristide to office for a second term. Opposition to his regime, which until then had been restricted to members of Haiti's powerful economic elite, as well as remnants of the Duvalier regime, became more open and more widespread, including alienated former supporters of Aristide.<sup>72</sup> Much of the international community, led by the United States, declared its dissatisfaction with the election that returned Aristide to office; eventually, the U.S. cut bilateral direct foreign assistance to Haiti.<sup>73</sup> Violence and protests continued throughout the next three years, culminating in the events of February 2004. Armed groups, led by Guy Philippe and Louis-Jodel Chamblain, took control of several northern cities and began to march on Port-au-Prince. On 29 February, Aristide resigned and was forced into exile under controversial circumstances.<sup>74</sup> Following Aristide's departure, the country was left paralyzed and on the verge of anarchy.

Low intensity conflict continues today, with the PNH and the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) struggling to re-establish a government presence beyond the capital of Port-au-Prince. Particular areas of concern include specific neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince still dominated by armed Aristide loyalists. The militias responsible for Aristide's departure – many with ties to Haiti's now disbanded armed forces (FAd'H) – have also thus far refused to demobilise or disarm. In many parts of the country they have occupied abandoned police stations and now constitute the sole source of order and authority in the region. It remains unclear if Préval's government will seek to displace these militias with more legitimate forces, or if it is even capable of such action. Until the government is able to establish a level of security throughout the country, it will continue to exist for many Haitians as a government in name only.

With regards to the drug trade, figures quoted by US officials suggest some 7-10 percent of the cocaine reaching the US market flows through Haiti.<sup>75</sup> Such high levels of cocaine traffic have numerous

adverse effects on the country. Internally, the amounts of money involved dwarf virtually every other economic activity in Haiti. Accusations of drug-related corruption continue to follow Haitians on all sides of the political spectrum and all levels of government, as well as in the private sector.<sup>76</sup> Some accusations end in conviction; many do not. Even when left unsubstantiated or proven untrue however, such accusations destabilise the country and enhance local and international perception of the entire government system as being unworthy of trust. Other criminal activities include kidnapping, extortion, corruption, intimidation, and other forms of violence. At their peak toward the end of 2005, kidnappings occurred at a rate of 14 per day.<sup>77</sup>

### *The Diaspora's Potential Contributions to Peace Building*

Having outlined problems fuelling persistent low-intensity civil violence and crime in Jamaica and Haiti, it is possible to consider ways in which their sizeable diaspora communities might contribute to reducing persistent violence and crime and also contribute to preventing the emergence of large-scale civil conflict. Given that the fundamental causes of upheaval in both countries likely stem from their respective political and socio-economic situations, it is logical to survey current and potential ways in which the diaspora community can have a positive impact on these fundamental drivers of conflict. But first, it is instructive to look at the perception of the diaspora of the social and political situations in their home communities.

#### *Haiti*

In interviews conducted with members of the Haitian diaspora in Montreal and New York, the word 'conflict' was not used to describe the social and political situation in Haiti. The word most often used was 'tension'. Interviewees described a situation of simmering low-level tension that occasionally flared into open violence and conflict, as opposed to a situation of continual conflict and violence that occasionally diminished to a level of simmering tension. One interviewee noted that this was a mark of Haitian national character and that the social-political-economic situation that exists in Haiti would likely inspire open conflict elsewhere in the Americas, but not in Haiti. In terms of the impact of the high level of tension in Haiti, those interviewed noted the primary impact was increased levels of stress as members of the diaspora worried about their kin and friends back in Haiti, but social and political tensions did not divide the diaspora the way tensions in Sri Lanka or Northern Ireland have divided those diasporas. Another interviewee noted that friends holding differing political views would simply agree not to talk about politics. However, a counterpoint to this was seen at the 2004 Montréal Conference of the Haitian Diaspora, where some 50 members of the diaspora picketed outside the conference attended by close to 500 of their compatriots.<sup>78</sup> The 2006 presidential elections and the ascendance to the presidency of René Préval seem to have healed this split. The visit of president-elect Préval to Canada was celebrated by both those who protested outside the 2004 Montréal and those who took part in the event.

While crime and security are major concerns of the Haitian diaspora, these concerns appear to take second place to issues of development. Throughout interviews and as seen during the 2004 Montréal conference, the diaspora not only identifies economic development as its primary concern, but links economic development to security, a reversal of the order most often used by the international development community.

### ***Jamaica***

In its broadest sense, the Jamaican diaspora is even more reluctant to use the term ‘conflict’ to describe the social-political situation in Jamaica. It is viewed as one of rampant criminality and some degree of corruption, but neither as one of conflict nor tension. Where the term conflict was used, it was in the narrow confines of interactions between political parties and between police and criminals. The crime situation in Jamaica is of overriding importance and concern to the Jamaican diaspora, however. During the 2006 Conference of the Jamaican Diaspora in Kingston, attended by over 500 members of the diaspora from Canada, the UK and the United States, the plenary resolution on crime stated that, “safeguarding the nation’s security is the responsibility of all Jamaicans including overseas Jamaicans.”<sup>79</sup>

### ***Human Capital and Skills***

As with many nations that witness significant proportions of their population migrating to the developed world each year, there are concerns in both Haiti and Jamaica over losing their best and brightest to developed countries through the process of ‘brain drain.’ For instance, an estimated 76 percent of Jamaicans with a college education are estimated to live in the United States alone, while 83.6 percent of Haiti’s population with some level of tertiary education eventually emigrates.<sup>80</sup> While this flow is often viewed in a negative light, it creates significant opportunities as well. Entrepreneurs and investors in the diaspora community may play a crucial role in transmitting new ideas and novel ways of doing business back to their home country.<sup>81</sup> In addition, members of the diaspora may apply skills acquired abroad to work on projects in their home country and/or train local practitioners.<sup>82</sup>

Clearly, countries' ability to capitalize on such opportunities depends to a great extent on the existence of sound government policy to enable and encourage diaspora investment. A brief survey indicates the wide variety of approaches adopted by developing states to harness the human and financial resources of its diaspora community.<sup>83</sup> As observed at a recent conference on Caribbean diasporas, a key obstacle to temporary or permanent return is a widespread perception that home governments are not overly welcoming. Several participants at the conference described "a general resentment in home country societies against those who have left," noting that, "such an attitude can discourage diaspora members from playing a more active role in their countries of origin."<sup>84</sup> A 2003 SIDS report indicated that much more can be done to encourage repatriation of Jamaican nationals and their services. It further pointed to the diaspora as a natural bridge into developed countries' markets.<sup>85</sup>

Steps have been taken in Jamaica to rectify this and treat the diaspora as an important part of national identity and national development. This is exemplified the creation of the Jamaican Diaspora Advisory Board (JDAB) in June of 2004,<sup>86</sup> whose role is to advise the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade on matters relating to the diaspora,<sup>87</sup> and by the establishment of the Jamaica Diaspora Foundations in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom.<sup>88</sup>

The Jamaican government has already taken some notice of this capacity; in a recent publication for the United Nations Commission on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD), it was explained that working with the diaspora community was crucial to fill the knowledge and technology gap facing Jamaica.<sup>89</sup> Noting that Jamaica alone cannot fill this gap, partnership with the diaspora community is described as crucial. A decision to work closely with diaspora professionals to transfer knowledge and encourage investment has apparently been made.<sup>90</sup>

The Haitian diaspora has consistently pressed the international community to assist by playing a greater role in the re-development of Haiti. One output of the 2004 Montréal conference of the Haitian Diaspora was a call for a database of Haitian professionals willing to return to Haiti to aid development activities. The interim government serving in Haiti after Aristide's departure was composed largely of

members of the diaspora. Aid agencies from the United States and Canada have seconded staff of Haitian origin on an *ad hoc* basis and hired consultants from the diaspora to fill positions in the Haitian government. However, given the overwhelming need, the lack of administrative capacity within the government, and the strong distrust of government by the diaspora, a more coherent, comprehensive and well-organized program will likely be needed to engage the diaspora more fully in efforts to rebuild the country. To this end, a program similar to the Repatriation of Qualified Afghans run by the International Organization of Migration may be useful.

In the case of Jamaica, the government and security forces are capable of implementing and administering programs to recruit and work with diaspora volunteers. These programs could easily be added to existing security cooperation programs between Jamaica and the United Kingdom, Canada and the US. The 2006 Conference of the Jamaican Diaspora featured several suggestions and resolutions along these lines.<sup>91</sup>

### ***Capital Flows***

In both Haiti and Jamaica, diaspora communities provide significant levels of direct financial support in the form of remittances. In a recent survey of diaspora communities in Canada, Simmons, Plaza and Piché found that 87.9 percent of Haitian households and 87.8 percent of Jamaican households remitted funds at least once in the previous five years; within the last year, the figures were 84.4 percent and 62.3 percent, respectively.<sup>92</sup> Even when households that did not remit funds are included in the calculation, Haitian households remitted an average of CAD\$401 last year, while Jamaican households sent CAD\$314.

The effects of these financial flows are substantial. In 2004, these private financial transfers accounted for 17.4 percent of Jamaica's GDP, and 24.8 percent of Haiti's.<sup>93</sup> In a recent survey of remittance recipients commissioned by FOCAL, over half of all recipients in Jamaica have been receiving money from their relatives abroad for more than five years, and most receive transfers at least once a month.<sup>94</sup> Moreover, Jamaica's national debt as a percentage of its export revenue falls from 167 to 121

percent when remittances are included in the calculation.<sup>95</sup> The United Nations Population Fund indicates that Jamaica's remittances to aid (Official Development Assistance) ratio stands at 15:1.<sup>96</sup> In dollar terms this amounted to \$1,425 billion in remittances in 2003, designating Jamaica as the country with the highest volume of remittances per capita in Latin America and the Caribbean that year.<sup>97</sup> Though spent primarily on consumption, remittances are also channelled into health care, education and community development.<sup>98</sup> At a micro level, families receiving remittances may have the opportunity to keep children out of the labour force and in school. When diaspora individuals and groups become involved at a community level through initiatives such as Mexico's "Padrino programme," there is the potential for substantial long-term benefits for recipient communities if managed creatively and cooperatively by donors, recipient communities, and government.<sup>99</sup> Jamaican diaspora church groups, such as those identified by Simmons, provide further examples of such beneficial partners.<sup>100</sup>

Remittances are also as a source of tension, and in some cases a cause of conflict, by members of the diaspora. Money that flows back for consumption can increase the gulf between haves and have-nots in poor communities. When remittance-fueled consumption mimics ostentatious fashions of inner-city communities in the diaspora, the same type of status symbol crime seen in ghetto neighbourhoods of New York, Miami and Brixton appears in Jamaica and Haiti as well.

Growing demand for products from migrants' home countries - Jamaica being one of them - has encouraged growth of the "nostalgic trade industry", particularly in the United States. This market, which revolves around travel, communications and home "ethnic" or "nostalgic" exports, is composed primarily of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in migrants' home countries.<sup>101</sup> It is also an industry that has significant potential to bolster economic development in Latin America and the Caribbean, since SMEs account for approximately 50 percent of manufacturing employment in the region.<sup>102</sup>

## ***Conflict Resolution***

Diaspora groups can have a significant impact in the political realm in their home country, with the potential to both improve and impair political processes. They may “lobby host countries to shape policies in favour of a homeland or ... challenge a homeland government; influence homelands through their support or opposition of governments; [and] give financial and other support to political parties, social movements, and civil society organizations.”<sup>103</sup>

In the case of Jamaica, given the perceived inefficiency and corruption hampering the country’s political climate, diaspora pressure to reform and improve governance may be seen as beneficial. More generally, the diaspora community occupies a unique niche, one that allows them to lobby both their home and host governments. They can exert pressure on their home government from abroad, free from the political intimidation and fear of retribution that can hamper such efforts at home;<sup>104</sup> they can also lobby their host country to put pressure their home government to enact policy favourable to their interests, ranging from calls for better anti-corruption measures and governance reform, to favourable international trade policies. Organizations such as Jamaica Impact Inc. (JAMPACT), a US based non-profit diaspora group with a stated mission “to use our collective energies, intelligence, and resources to make positive contributions towards the improvement of social and economic conditions in Jamaica,” provide examples of diaspora groups lobbying for change within their host countries.<sup>105</sup>

In contrast, the net impact of diaspora groups on the political process in Haiti is considerably more ambiguous. While apolitical support for homeland conflict resolution efforts are generally positive, overly partisan political engagement by diaspora groups in the homeland may in some cases encourage more intransigent behaviour by homeland politicians, particularly in countries with a history of deep social divisions, or open conflict. The recent electoral exercise seems to have muted such behaviours however, as diaspora members from all sides of the political spectrum now seem willing to recognize Préval’s new administration and support its efforts to move beyond past divisions and resume development in the country. To a large extent, such efforts will depend on continued good will and active

support from the diapsora community, as well as the ability of Préval's government to successfully harness those resources.

### *Crime*

There is also the potential for immigrant groups to bring with them criminal patterns from their country of origin; historical examples of such activity extend from the arrival of the Cosa Nostra in North America in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century to the global proliferation of Russian-based criminal groups in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite continuing debate regarding the true impact of criminal deportees on crime in Haiti and Jamaica, there are nonetheless firm reasons to suspect some connection. In essence, the practice by Canada and the US of deporting convicted criminals to Jamaica and Haiti might be termed trade in human criminal capital. The potential exists for such criminals to use the skills and knowledge acquired in the host to manipulate immigration systems, illegally re-entering the country and acting as a criminal entrepreneur, facilitating activity between host and home countries, to the detriment of both.<sup>106</sup> Noting that 40 percent of all deportees from Canada are Jamaicans, the Jamaican Diaspora Canada Foundation (mentioned above) has vowed to lobby for change in what it perceives as unfair deportation practices; such efforts provide a good example of diaspora groups working to effect policy change in host countries.<sup>107</sup> Lobbying host countries like Canada for policy action in this area is likely more effective from within than from without, particularly when one considers the ability of diaspora communities to make or break politicians in key ridings at election time through strategic block voting.

In addition to lobbying policy makers at home and abroad, the diaspora may make a more concrete contribution to preventing conflict, or stifling crime in Jamaica's case. As noted above, a connection exists between some of the violence that occurs in Jamaica and violence in foreign cities home to significant migrant communities. The JCF, having recognized both this overseas crime connection and the fact that diaspora groups are often close-knit and cognizant of most of what goes on within their community, recently called on the Jamaican diaspora to work with the JCF to fight crime. In February

2006, a senior JCF panel urged the diaspora to be forthcoming in terms of support and intelligence, asking them to relay information that might help police.<sup>108</sup>

### *Conclusions*

This paper represents an exploration of the numerous ways in which the Haitian and Jamaican diasporas are intimately related to the ‘drivers’ of conflict, tension, or low-intensity violence that dominates the political and economic landscapes of their home countries. To a certain extent, the two countries’ common status as small island developing states is reflected in the presence of similar diaspora experiences; however, the unique social, political and economic histories of each country have had a pronounced effect, influencing both the nature and the magnitude of the diaspora-home country relationship. Though some of these relationships may appear relatively straightforward at first glance, in general they are both complex in nature and ambiguous in effect, requiring rigorous further analysis in order to more fully understand the causal relationships that exist between each country’s economic and political stability and their diaspora communities around the world.

## ***Appendix One: List of Interviews***

### **Haiti**

Jean Saint-Vil, founding member of the Ottawa Haiti Solidarity Committee (Kozayiti) and L'association Canado-Haitien pour sauvegarder la souverainete d'Haiti (Lachasausha) Ottawa, Canada. 02 June 2006

Robert Tippenhauer, Ambassador, Embassy of Haiti to Canada. Ottawa, Canada. 5 June 2006.

Nathalie Gissele Menos, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of Haiti to Canada. Ottawa, Canada. 5 June 2006.

Eric Faustin, directeur general, Regroupment des Organismes canado-haitiens pour le development (ROCHAD). Montréal , Canada. 06 June 2005.

Franz Voltaire, Director, Centre international de documentation et d'information Haïtienne Caraïbénne et Afro-Canadienne. Montréal , Canada. 06 June 2005.

Pierre-Richard Casimir Consul Général d'Haïti à Montréal. Montréal , Canada. 06 June 2006-06-27

Keder Hyppolite. President, Conseil National des Citoyens et Citoyennes d'Origine Haïtienne (CONACOH). Montréal, Canada. 06 June 2006.

### **Jamaica**

Observation of proceedings, speeches, interventions and exchanges at 500 person diaspora conference. 2006 Jamaican Diaspora Conference. Kingston, Jamaica. 15-16 June, 2006.

Dale Jones, Consul, Consulate of Jamaica in Toronto. Toronto, Canada. 10 May 2006.

Anne-Marie Bonner, Consul General, Consulate of Jamaica in Toronto. Toronto, Canada. 10 May 2006.

Howard Foster, President, Caribbean People Masses Unity Committee CPMUC, Kingston, Jamaica. 16 June 2006.

Philip Mascoll, President, Jamaica Diaspora - Canada Foundation. Kingston, Jamaica. 16 June 2006

Sandra Carnegie-Douglas, President, Jamaican-Canadian Association. Kingston, Jamaica. 16 June 2006.

***Appendix Two: Interview Script***

Interviewee

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Organization: \_\_\_\_\_

Diaspora\_\_\_ Government\_\_\_ Other\_\_\_\_\_

Diaspora

1. Born in Diaspora or Ha/Ja
2. Amount of time in Diaspora? \_\_\_\_\_
3. Family in \_\_\_Ha \_\_\_Ja \_\_\_None
4. Average number of visits to Ha/Ja over past 5 years \_\_\_\_\_
5. View media/news (on-line, TV, print, etc) from Ja/Ha:

\_\_\_ daily

\_\_\_ more than 1x/week

\_\_\_ at least 1/x week

\_\_\_ less than 1x wee

\_\_\_ do not read/view media from Ha/Ja

6. Frequency of calls to or from Ja/Ha

\_\_\_ daily

\_\_\_ more than 3/week

\_\_\_ at least 1/x week

\_\_\_ less than 1x wee

\_\_\_ do not receive calls from or make calls to Ha/Ja

Question:

- A. How would you describe the social conditions and relations between different classes, political, religious, civil society organizations in Ja/Ha?
- B. Ja/Ha society has been described as being in conflict or suffering from conflict. Conflict is a broad ambiguous concept that takes on different meanings for different groups and in different contexts. If a broader understanding of conflict as a natural multidimensional phenomenon that is typically indicative of change within society that occurs when two or more parties believe that their interests are incompatible, express hostile attitudes or take action that damages other parties' ability to pursue their interests and that becomes violent when parties no longer seek to attain their goals peacefully, but resort instead to violence in one form or another. Would you feel that all, part of none of this description would apply to Ja/Ha?
- C. What do you see as the impact upon the Diaspora of the social situation in Ja/Ha as you described it?
- D. What do you see as the impact of the Diaspora upon the social situation in Ja/Ha as you describe it?
- E. Are there specific examples that you can think of where the Diaspora has contributed toward improving the social situation in Ja/Ha as you describe it?
- F. If so, do you think these interventions have been successful? Why? How can you tell?

- G. What factors, conditions, programmes, etc., facilitated or hindered the Diaspora from becoming involved in a positive manner? Government? Host country social conditions? Home country conditions? Donors? Social/religious groups? PS?
- H. Are there conditions, programmes, or factors that promote negative contributions from the Diaspora? Governments? Host country conditions? Home country conditions? Donors? Social groups? PS?
- I. Are there major differences among the Diaspora in terms of its engagement with Ha/Ja? If so, what are these?
- J. Are there major differences between youth/gender social class, religions, education level in terms of engagement?
- K. What special contributions could the Diaspora, or segments of the Diaspora, could make that are not being undertaken now?
- L. What would be key for donors, aid agencies and other development actors in working with the Diaspora?

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Carment, David, Prest, Stewart, and Yiagadeesen, Samy, "Assessing the Fragility of Small Island Developing States," in Lino Briguglio, Gordon Cordina, and Ellawony J. Kisanga (Eds.), *Building the Economic Resilience of Fragile States*, (Formatek Publishing, on behalf of Islands and Small States Institute of the University of Malta and the Commonwealth Secretariat: Malta, 2006). p 14, 16. Archived on "Country Indicators for Foreign Policy" site.

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<sup>2</sup> See generally: Barrera, Bouffard, Harrington & Unheim. "Jamaica: A Risk Assessment Brief", Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) (February 2006).

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<sup>3</sup> Dade, Carlo, "Remittances, Diasporas and Canadian Foreign and Development Policy: Definitions and Options. Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) (Forthcoming).

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<sup>15</sup> It is worthwhile to note here that the countercyclical nature of remittance flows tends to soften the impact of economic shocks and natural disasters on recipient countries. See *Global Economic Prospects 2006*, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)/World Bank, Washington, DC, p. 99.

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<sup>68</sup> Though the circumstances are not completely analogous, the argument to some extent parallels that of Hudson and den Boer's "surplus males" theory regarding South Asia. In both cases, young under-engaged males become vectors for social violence. In South Asia, the problem is the result of a high male-to-female ratio; in Haiti, the problem stems from a lack of gainful employment. Valerie Hudson and Andrea den Boer, *Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population*, (MIT Press: Cambridge MA, 2004)

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<sup>78</sup> Rapport final de la Conférence de Montréal avec la Diaspora haïtienne, 14 January 2005. Canadian Foundation for the Americas.  
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<sup>89</sup> Arnoldo Ventura (Special Adviser to the Prime Minister). "Bridging the Technological Divide between and Within Countries – The Jamaican Approach"

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<sup>91</sup> Examples of ideas put forth by diaspora attendees at the 2006 conference in Kingston included a proposal by the UK delegation for having Jamaican-origin members of constabulary forces in the UK volunteer to provide technical assistance to the Jamaican constabulary forces and a resolution by the Canadian delegation for it to undertake facilitating the transfer to Jamaica of community policing resources and resources for citizen oversight of police forces.

<sup>92</sup> The Remittance Sending Practices Of Haitians And Jamaicans In Canada. Alan Simmons, Dwaine Plaza, and Victor Piché. Report to CIDA – substantive 05.05.28. Canadian International Development Agency.

<sup>93</sup> World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects 2006*, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)/World Bank, Washington, DC, p. 90

<sup>94</sup> Market Research Services Ltd, “A Survey of the Remittance Market in Jamaica”, FOCAL, PowerPoint Presentation for the Canada-Caribbean Diasporas and Development Conference Series, May 30-31, 2005, Toronto and Montreal.

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<sup>96</sup> Compared to a 34:1 ratio in Mexico, 24:1 in Costa Rica, 8:1 in the Philippines and 4:1 in Lesotho.

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<sup>98</sup> Simmons, Alan, Plaza, Dwaine and Piche, “The Remittance Sending Practices of Haitians and Jamaicans in Canada”, CERLAC Report, (October 2005).

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<http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/print.cfm?id=313> (accessed May 18, 2006)

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<sup>104</sup> The recent murder of two of Jamaica's most well known gay activists aptly demonstrates the potential dangers of activism within the country, while possible connections between politicians and gangs poses further dangers: Gary Younge. "Troubled island." The Guardian (Thursday April 27, 2006) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Columnists/Column/0,,1762156,00.html> (accessed May 19, 2006) "Brian Williamson, used to run a club called Entourage. Williamson was the public face of gay rights in the country, the only person willing to go before the cameras or sign his own name to letters to the press advocating gay rights in Jamaica. On June 9 2004, Williamson was found murdered in his home, the victim of multiple knife wounds to his head and neck. [Later, there was] a small crowd singing and dancing. One man called out, "Batty man [derogatory term for a gay man] he get killed." Others were celebrating, laughing and shouting "Let's get them one at a time", "That's what you get for sin". Others sang "Boom bye bye", a line from a well-known dancehall song by Jamaican star Buju Banton about shooting and burning gay men." & also:

"Four Arrested In Gay Jamaican AIDS Worker Murder" 365Gay.com Newscenter (March 9, 2006)

<http://www.365gay.com/Newscon06/03/030906jamaica.htm> (accessed May 18, 2006) "Lenford "Steve" Harvey ... ran Jamaica AIDS Support for Life. Harvey was shot to death on the eve of World AIDS Day last December. Support for Life provides support to gay men and sex workers.

Harvey was openly gay and well known in Jamaica.

Gunmen burst into Harvey's home confronting him and his two roommates.

The armed men demanded money. "We hear that you are gay," the gunmen yelled at the trio. The two housemates denied it but Harvey apparently remained silent. The housemates were gagged and bound.

Harvey was ordered at gunpoint to help the gunmen carry valuables to his car. He was forced into the vehicle and kidnapped by his attackers.

Two hours later, he was found, shot dead."

<sup>105</sup> See Jamaica Impact Inc. "JAMPACT", <http://www.jampact.org> (accessed May 19, 2006).

<sup>106</sup> Barrera, Bouffard, Harrington & Unheim. "Jamaica: A Risk Assessment Brief", Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) (February 2006).

[http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/brief\\_jamaica.pdf](http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/brief_jamaica.pdf) (accessed May 14, 2006).

<sup>107</sup> Leonardo Blair, Enterprise Reporter, JAMAICAN DIASPORA DISTURBED:

Vexed and vocal (Sunday June 26, 2005)

<http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20050626/lead/lead1.html>

<sup>108</sup> Jamaican Diaspora encouraged to work with Police to fight crime. Caymen Net News (Wednesday, February 9, 2006).

<http://www.caymannetnews.com/2006/02/1025/jamaican/dis.shtml> (accessed May 18, 2006)